On the Geachian Theory of the Trinity and Incarnation: A Reply to Jedwab

In a recent article Joseph Jedwab argues against what he calls the "Geachian theory of the Trinity and Incarnation" and proposes an alternative account based upon a "non-Geachian relative-identity theory." Jedwab focuses his criticisms on a version of the Geachian theory that I once proposed. As one of his criticisms is based on a misreading of my account and other criticisms fail to do adequate justice to the Geachian theory, a reply is in order. Jedwab's central charge is that the Geachian theory has untenable doctrinal implications. I will argue that he fails to substantiate this claim. Jedwab gives several examples in which he thinks the Geachian view leads to doctrinal error. With respect to these examples we will see that the same theological content is affirmed by Jedwab and by the Geachian theory, though the phrasing by which that content is expressed differs. Jedwab's second major criticism is directed toward my treatment of Christological predication. Unfortunately here his criticism is based on a misreading of what I said on the subject. I will begin by summarizing the Geachian theory, alongside Jedwab's alternative. Then I will respond to Jedwab's criticisms.

There are a number of features of Geach's account of relative identity upon which the Geachian Theory of the Trinity and Incarnation rests. The most obvious is a claim that Jedwab labels the "sortal relativity of identity" (SRI) which says that for readings of "R" and "S" as sortals it could be the case that x and y are the same R but different S's. This has obvious application to the doctrine of the Trinity: the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are said to be the same God but different persons. SRI, or something like it, is accepted by all accounts of the Trinity and Incarnation that rely on relative identity to explicate the doctrines.
The Geachian theory also appeals to features of Geach's account of relative identity that deal with proper names and the interpretation of quantifiers. Geach holds that a proper name has a sense that includes a criterion of identity. Where the proper name "a" is associated with the criterion of identity for being the same R, we say that "a" is a name for an R. If "a" is a proper name of an object that happens to be an R, then "a" is said to be a name of an R. Geach's account of relative identity allows for the possibility that we have a name of an R that is not a name for an R. An example (not Geach's) will help to illustrate these ideas. Imagine that I am a sculptor. In my studio I have a number of distinct clay pieces. My custom is to shape them into statues and rent them out. When a statue is returned, the clay piece is reshaped into a new statue which is then rented out. I may give the clay pieces proper names associated with the criterion of identity for being the same clay piece, and I may give the statues proper names associated with the criterion of identity for being the same statue. Let's say that I use "David" as a name for a statue and "Clay" as a name for a clay piece. Suppose that the statue David is formed from the clay piece Clay. Then we have the following: David is a statue. David is also a clay piece; in fact David is the same clay piece as Clay. Clay is a clay piece. Clay is also a statue, the same statue as David. "David" is a name for a statue, but not a name for a clay piece. On the other hand "David" is a name of a statue and a name of a clay piece. Similarly "Clay" is a name for a clay piece, but not a name for a statue, and yet it is both a name of a clay piece and a name of a statue. Because "David" and "Clay" individuate their reference under different criteria of identity we may not always be able to replace one name by the other in a sentence without altering the truth value of the sentence. Suppose the statue David is only a few days old, whereas Clay has existed for many months. Then "Clay is over a month old" will be true, but if we replace the name "Clay" with "David" the resultant sentence will be false. Jedwab's non-Geachian relative identity
theory accepts Geach's view that proper names convey a criterion of identity and, where "same R" expresses such a criterion of identity, it accepts the distinction between a name for an R and a name of an R.6

Continuing with the example we may see how Geach's account of restricted quantifiers is developed in terms of his account of relative identity. Restricted quantifiers are quantifiers of the form "some R", "any R", "no R", etc., where the quantifier ranges over objects individuated under the criterion of identity given by "same R". It may be that none of my statues is over one month old but all my clay pieces are. Thus the falsehood "some statue is over a month old" cannot be analyzed as "something is a statue and it is over a month old," for the latter is true since Clay is a statue (the same statue as David) and is over a month old.7 Instead we must think of "some statue is over a month old" as saying that some object individuated as a statue is over a month old. Geach puts forward this idea by saying that "some R is F" holds iff "a is F" is true for some reading of "a" as a name of and for an R. Similarly, "any R is F" holds iff "a is F" is true for any reading of "a" as a name of and for an R. (I will follow Jedwab and sometimes write "Some R is F" as "Some R x is such that x is F", and write "Any R is F" as "Any R x is such that x is F".) Geach also allows for the use of unrestricted quantifiers (quantifiers of the form "something", "anything", "nothing", etc.) that do not supply a criterion of identity for individuating the objects over which the quantifiers range. "For some x, x is F" (or "Something is F") holds true iff "a is F" is true for some reading of "a" as a name. "For any x, x is F" (or "Anything is F") holds true iff "a is F" holds true for any reading of "a" as a name.8

In Geach's account of identity there is a close tie between restricted quantification and ascriptions of cardinality. Jedwab's treatment of cardinality diverges from Geach's, and both of their accounts diverge from what may be called the 'standard' analysis of cardinality statements,
an analysis that relies on the notion of absolute identity. It will be helpful to indicate the
difference. Let us begin with propositions of the form "At least one R is F" where "same R"
provides an individuating identity. The standard analysis (1S), Jedwab's analysis (1J), and the
Geachian analysis (1G) of "at least one R is F" are as follows:

(1S)   Something x is such that x is R and x is F.9
(1J)   Something x is such that x is R and x is F.10
(1G)   Some R x is such that x is F.11

The three ways of analyzing "At least two Rs are F" are as follows:

(2S)   Something x is such that x is R, x is F, something y is such that y is R, y is F, and x is not
       the same as y.12
(2J)   Something x is such that x is R, x is F, something y is such that y is R, y is F, and x is not
       the same R as y.13
(2G)   Some R x is such that x is F, some R y is such that y is F, and x is not the same R as y.14

It should be clear how one could extend these analyses to handle propositions of the form "At
least n Rs are F" for various readings of "n" as a numeral. Using these analyses we can define
standard, Jedwabian, and Geachian readings of "At most n Rs are Fs" and "Exactly n Rs are F".
"At most n Rs are F" will be equivalent to "It is not the case that at least n+1 Rs are F", and
"Exactly n Rs are F" will be equivalent to "At least n Rs are F and at most n Rs are F".
In particular, "The one and only R (that is P) is F" can be analyzed as "Exactly one R (that is P) exists and [it] is F." An equivalent (somewhat shorter) analysis of "The one and only R (that is P) is F" for the three accounts is the following:

\[(DS) \quad \text{Something } x \text{ is such that } x \text{ is R (and } x \text{ is P), and for any } y \text{ such that } y \text{ is R (and } y \text{ is P), } y \text{ is the same as } x, \text{ and } x \text{ is F.}\]

\[(DJ) \quad \text{Something } x \text{ is such that } x \text{ is R (and } x \text{ is P), and for any } y \text{ such that } y \text{ is R (and } y \text{ is P), } y \text{ is the same R as } x, \text{ and } x \text{ is F.}\]

\[(DG) \quad \text{Some } R \, x \text{ is such that } (x \text{ is P and) for any } R \, y \text{ (such that } y \text{ is P), } y \text{ is the same R as } x, \text{ and } x \text{ is F.}\]

In every case (1J, 2J and DJ), Jedwab's analysis follows the standard analysis by using unrestricted quantifiers where the Geachian analysis uses restricted quantifiers. But where the standard analysis employs the absolute identity predicate Jedwab follows the Geachian analysis by employing a relativized identity predicate. Jedwab holds that by using his analysis several putative difficulties involved in the Geachian account of the Trinity and the Incarnation can be avoided. We will return to that matter later.

I am well aware that Geach's view that a proper name conveys a criterion of identity as part of its sense and Geach's analysis of restricted quantification are controversial. My own thought is that even if it could be shown that Geach's account mischaracterizes our use of identity predicates, proper names and quantifiers in ordinary English, it does not follow that Geach's ideas cannot be used in a way that helps us to better grasp the doctrine of the Trinity and the Incarnation. For, even if English does not conform to Geach's account, it would appear that
we can modify English in a straightforward and intelligible way so that it does conform to
Geach's account of language.\(^\text{17}\) (It is, after all, easy to speak about statues and clay pieces in the
Geachian way set out above.) And it may be the case that in such a Geachian language the
doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation could be stated perspicuously in a way that avoids what
are often taken to be logical tangles in common statements of the doctrines. Historically
important formulations of the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation have come with the
introduction of specialized uses and refinements of language.

The Geachian account allows for a natural explanation of a certain class of reduplicative
expressions of the form "as an R, a is F" where "a" is a proper name, "F" is a predicate and "R"
expresses an individuating identity.\(^\text{18}\) We may recognize a use of reduplication that has the
following analysis:

\[(\text{SR}) \quad \text{As an R, a is F iff some R is the same R as a and is F.}\] \(^\text{19}\)

Given Geach's analysis of restricted quantification this is equivalent to:

\[(\text{SR'}) \quad \text{As an R, a is F iff for some interpretation of } b_R \text{ as a name for an R, } b_R \text{ is the same R as a and is F.}\] \(^\text{20}\)

For the purposes of this paper it will be helpful to take (SR') as our official analysis of the sense
of reduplicative expressions that is of current concern.\(^\text{21}\) The logic of this form of reduplicative
expression falls out from the preceding treatment of relative identity. So for example, from "as
God, the Father is unchanging" and "the Father is the same God as Jesus" we may deduce, "as
God, Jesus is unchanging". If "Yahweh" is a name for a God, then from "as God, Jesus is unchanging" and "Jesus is the same God as Yahweh" we may deduce "Yahweh is unchanging". But from the premises "as a person the Son is begotten" and "the Father is the same God as the Son" the above principles give us no grounds to deduce "as a person the Father is begotten."

It should be noted that this treatment of reduplicative expressions is not meant to be exhaustive. There are other forms of reduplicative expressions that must be given alternative analyses. For example, there is a perfectly good sense in which a Christian will want to say "as a human God lived among us." Such a use of reduplication is perfectly acceptable, yet its analysis will differ from that given above, and it will have different logical features.

Now let us consider Jedwab’s criticisms of the Geachian account. I will begin by looking at his criticism of my treatment of the term "Christ." Jedwab takes me to task for (supposedly) saying that "Christ" is a name for a divine person and for a human. I agree that such a position would lead to grave difficulties, but I never took the position Jedwab attributes to me. In my original paper I simply left it an open question how the term "Christ" might be associated with a criterion of identity, and I noted that however that question was answered one could use reduplication in order to individuate the reference of "Christ" as needed. Thus, for example, I can say "As God, Christ is unchanging" to say that Christ as individuated by his divine nature is unchanging, and by saying this I bypass the concern over whether the term "Christ", taken by itself, individuates under the criterion of identity for being, say, the same divine person or whether it individuates under the criterion of identity for being the same human.

Jedwab also argues that the Geachian theory cannot successfully treat the term "Christ" as associated with a criterion of identity. Consider two possibilities: (1) "Christ" is associated with the criterion of identity for being the same divine person and (2) "Christ" is associated with the
criterion of identity for being the same human. Jedwab and I would agree that we cannot reasonably simultaneously associate "Christ" with both criteria. But, Jedwab holds, it would be "unprincipled" to associate "Christ" with just one of the criteria. I do not see why this should be unprincipled. It may be the case that in established usage of the term "Christ" is associated with a fixed criterion of identity. (I do not have the expertise to make a judgement on this matter.) Or it may be that different criteria are associated with the term in different contexts. I do not see why either of these possibilities would be problematic. A non-theological example may help to make the point. "Christ" is sometimes spoken of as functioning like the title "the anointed one". Let's imagine that someone pours oil over one of my statue/clay-pieces—for example, David/Clay—and begins to speak of "the anointed one". I may be unsure on a particular occasion what criterion of identity is being associated with this phrase: is it given by "same statue" or "same clay-piece"? If the person simply says, "The anointed one weighs 50 pounds", then in a sense it does not matter which of the two criteria of identity is being used since it will not affect the truth value of what is being said. In this case, even if the criterion of identity is left indeterminate, and thus the utterance suffers from a form of ambiguity, that will be of no practical consequence. On the other hand, if I hear the utterance "The anointed one has been to both London and Paris", then it may make a difference which criterion of identity is being used, for the statue David may not have been to both cities even though the clay-piece Clay has been. But even without disambiguating the description, "the anointed one", we can succeed in communicating by using reduplication: I can affirm that, as a clay piece, the anointed one has been to both cities and deny that, as a statue, the anointed one has been to both cities. It could even be the case that "the anointed one" is used in one context with the criterion of identity for being the same statue and in another context with the criterion of identity for being the same clay-piece. Our use of language
can be rather flexible. I am not advocating a particular account of how the word "Christ" functions; nevertheless, I do not see Jedwab's worries as posing substantial difficulties for the Geachian theory.\textsuperscript{28}

Setting aside Jedwab's Christological objections, the general form his criticisms seem to take is to single out particular Christian doctrines and attempt to show that the Geachian theory gets them wrong while his contrasting non-Geachian relative identity theory gets them right. Thus he appears to try to show that the Geachian theory is subject to various doctrinal errors. Before looking at specific examples some methodological remarks are in order. It is possible for theories that do not genuinely conflict in the claims they make about the nature of things to appear to conflict because they use the same expressions to mean different things: a sentence taken with one meaning might be affirmed by one theory and taken with a different meaning denied by another theory without there being a genuine disagreement. There is a real danger of this happening in the present case since the Geachian theory and Jedwab's alternative give different analyses to sentences containing restricted quantifiers, definite descriptions, and expressions of cardinality. If we had a way of translating sentences from one theory into the other, then we might be able to better assess the extent to which there is genuine doctrinal disagreement.\textsuperscript{29} Fortunately, we have the resources to make such a translation, and as far as I can see in the examples Jedwab considers there does not really appear to be a conflict between the two theories.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to develop a full account of how to carry out translations between sentences read with a Geachian interpretation and sentences as interpreted by Jedwab. The basic idea can be illustrated by using some examples. It will help to develop the idea of a Geachian language (a G-language) and a Jedwabian language (a J-language). The two
languages share a common vocabulary but give alternative interpretations to the expressions of the language. I will speak of an expression of the G-language (or an expression of the J-language) to mean an expression understood according to the semantics given by the Geachian account (or Jedwab's account). Proper names, simple predicates (e.g., "\( \tilde{\Omega} \) is green", "\( \tilde{\Omega} \) is the same God as \( \tilde{\Theta} \)"), truth-functional operators, and unrestricted quantifiers receive the same treatment in both languages and so do not need to be altered in translation. The two languages also give uniform accounts of reduplicative expressions (see SR'), and so they will not need to be altered when translating.\(^{30}\)

On the other hand, expressions containing restricted quantifiers, 'definite descriptions', and phrases of the form "at least (at most, exactly) \( n \) R's" receive different interpretations and need to be rephrased in translation. Let us translate "At least one human suffers" from the J-language into the G-language. If we look at Jedwab's analysis, given in (1J), for sentences of the form "At least one R is F" we see that "At least one human suffers" is true if and only if the following condition holds:

\[(6) \quad \text{Something } x \text{ is such that } x \text{ is human and } x \text{ suffers.} \]

Note that (6) is a sentence of both the J-language and the G-language and that it means the same thing in both languages. Thus we may take (6) to be our translation of "At least one human suffers." The idea behind this translation may be generalized. Suppose that "F" is a predicate of the J-language and "F*" is a translation of it into the G-language; then the J-language sentence "At least one R is F" may be translated by the G-language sentence "Something x is such that x is R and x is F*" (or, more succinctly, as "Something is an R and is F*"\(^{31}\)). In a similar way we
can handle translations involving "at least (at most, exactly) n R's" from the J-language to the G-language.

Of special interest are J-language sentences of the form "God is F". Jedwab treats the expression "God" in sentences of this form as functioning as a definite description; in other words, in the J-language, "God is F" is short for "the one and only God is F". In conformity with (DJ), Jedwab spells out the truth conditions for "God is F" as "Something is God, is the same God as anything that is God, and is F". Using these truth conditions, we may obtain a translation into the G-language. Where "F*" is a G-language predicate that translates the J-language predicate "F", we have the following translation principle:

(Tr1) The J-language sentence "(The one and only) God is F" may be translated by the G-language sentence "Something is God, is the same God as anything that is God, and is F*".

Now let us consider translations from the G-language into the J-language. A key to translating G-language expressions is to note that G-language restricted quantifiers can be rewritten in terms of G-language unrestricted quantifiers and reduplication. Thus the G-language sentences "Some R is F" and "Any R is F" are (respectively) equivalent to the G-language sentences "Something is such that, as an R, it is F" and "Anything is such that if it is an R, then, as an R, it is F". But, as we saw, translating unrestricted quantifiers and reduplication between the G- and J-languages is unproblematic. Thus we have the following translation principles. Suppose "F*" is a J-language predicate that translates the G-language predicate "F"; then:
(Tr2) The G-language sentence "Some R is F" may be translated by the J-language sentence "Something is such that, as an R, it is F*".

(Tr3) The G-language sentence "Any R is F" may be translated by the J-language sentence "Anything is such that if it is an R, then, as an R, it is F*".

In this way we are able to indirectly express Geachian restricted quantification in the J-language. And, once we can express restricted quantification in the J-language, translating "at least (at most, exactly) n R's" from the G-language into the J-language becomes straightforward (and so may be left as an exercise for the reader). Of particular interest are G-language sentences of the form "The one and only R is F", where "R" expresses an individuating identity. Assuming that the J-language predicate "F*" translates the G-language predicate "F", we have:

(Tr4) The G-language sentence "The one and only R is F" may be translated by the J-language sentence "The one and only R, as an R, is F*".33

Assuming "same God as" provides an individuating identity, as a special case of (TR4) we have:

(Tr5) The G-language sentence "(The one and only) God is F" may be translated by the J-language sentence "(The one and only) God, as God, is F*".

Now let us turn to the doctrinal statements that Jedwab believes the Geachian theory gets wrong. My view is that in general, when Jedwab exhibits a sentence S that he thinks is true and that he thinks the Geachian theory wrongly treats as false, the following is what is really the
case: The J-language sentence $S$ and its G-language translation are both true, and the G-language sentence $S$ and its J-language translation are both false. Thus there is no real doctrinal disparity between Jedwab's account and the Geachian account. I will not run through all Jedwab's examples but will consider some representative cases. Take sentences of the form "(The one and only) God is F" where "is F" is replaced by "is a divine person", "is human", "begets", "is begotten", "proceeds", or "is incarnate". Jedwab affirms all of these. Their G-language translation is given by "Something is God, is the same God as anything that is God, and is F" where the same predicate replaces "F". All these are clearly true (assuming traditional Christian doctrine). For example, if we let "F" be "is a divine person" then the G-language translation holds since something (e.g., the Father) is God, is the same God as anything that is God and is a divine person. And if we let "F" be "is human" then the G-sentence translation is true since something (namely Jesus) is God, is the same God as anything that is God and is a human.

For the same readings of F consider the G-sentences of the form "(The one and only) God is F". Jedwab argues that these are all false on the Geachian theory. Their J-language translation is given by "(The one and only) God, as God, is F". These sentences Jedwab also holds to be false on his account. Thus we find him saying:

So God is a divine person and God is a human. God begets, God is begotten, and God proceeds. And God is incarnate. But, though God is a divine person and God is a human, on (SR'), we still have the result that, as God, God is not a divine person and, as God, God is not a human. And, though God is begotten and incarnate, on (SR'), we still have the result that, as God, God is neither begotten nor incarnate.\textsuperscript{34}
So far there does not appear to be a doctrinal conflict between the Geachian theory and Jedwab's theory. But there are other examples that initially may look more difficult to reconcile.

The passage just cited continues with further examples that deserve attention:

Now, however, since God is a divine person, on (SR'), we have the result that, as a divine person, God begets and, as a divine person, God is begotten. And now, since God is a human, on (SR'), we have the result that, as a human, God is born.\(^{35}\)

Take the J-language sentence "As a divine person, (the one and only) God begets". Its G-language translation is "Something x is such that x is God, x is the same God as anything that is God, and, as a divine person, x begets", which is true since the Father is God, the Father is the same God as anything that is God, and as a divine person the Father begets. On the other hand, consider the G-language sentence "As a divine person, (the one and only) God begets", which Jedwab takes to be false on the Geachian theory.\(^{36}\) Its J-language translation is given by "(The one and only) God, as God, as a divine person begets." The iteration of reduplicative expressions can make this hard to read (for example, we have to read "as God" as having a wider scope than "as a divine person"), but when it is understood according to (SR') it comes out false. (At least it comes out false on Jedwab's account since, as we saw, he holds that, as God, God is not a divine person.) We get the same results for the other examples in the above passage.

So I am not convinced that Jedwab has shown that there is any real disagreement in doctrine between his theory and Geachian accounts. Nonetheless, we need to look more closely at Jedwab's worry that the Geachian theory requires that we hold that God is not a person.\(^{37}\) How might the Geachian account answer the question of whether God is a person? Since "same person
as" expresses an equivalence relation, God cannot be the same person as more than one of the Father, Son and Spirit. It would seem that God is not the same person as just one of the three. So either (1) God is a fourth person or (2) God is not to be counted as a person. In some respects (1) may seem like a reasonable option. We speak of God as having various features (knowledge, intentions, power to govern the world, etc.) that seem to mark him out as a person. But (1), with its apparent reference to four divine persons, seems to run counter to traditional formulations of the traditional doctrine of the Trinity. An alternative is to accept (2) and say that God is not a person but is rather a trinity of persons. This may seem problematic since, as just mentioned, we speak of God as having knowledge, having intentions, being rational, etc., and these seem to be the mark of being a person. Furthermore, as Jedwab points out, "Scripture and tradition consistently represent God as someone to whom first- and second-person pronouns apply," and the application of such a pronoun seems to imply recognition of the personal status of the pronoun’s referent. My inclination is to think that the unity of the three persons of the Trinity is such that we may think of the knowledge had by the persons of the Trinity (apart of the human knowledge possessed by Jesus in the incarnation) as the knowledge of God, the intentions of the three persons (apart from the human intentions of Jesus in the incarnation) as the intentions of God, and so on. Perhaps it is a part of the mystery of the Trinity that the unity of the life of the three persons is such that we may speak of God as if God were one person, and the three persons of the Trinity may speak as one with the voice of God.

References


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1 Joseph Jedwab, "Against the Geachian Theory of the Trinity and Incarnation."

2 James Cain, "The Doctrine of the Trinity and the Logic of Relative Identity."

3 Though I follow Jedwab in speaking of my account as the "Geachian theory," I will leave it to the reader to decide whether my account faithfully captures Geach's intentions.

4 Though Geach has argued that the classical absolute conception of identity is incoherent, nothing I say will depend on accepting this view.

5 In "The Doctrine of the Trinity" I considered a Geachian account which associates the name "Jesus" with the criterion of identity for being the same human. An alternative Geachian account (mentioned at the end of the paper) associates "Jesus" with the criterion of identity for being the same person. For the purposes of this paper we may leave it an open question which account is preferable.

6 Jedwab, "Against the Geachian Theory," 142.

7 To simplify our discussion I will restrict the domain of objects under discussion in the example to statues and clay-pieces that have been in my possession.

8 Geach, *Reference and Generality*, 206.
For a critique of Geach’s view that proper names convey a criterion of identity, see Kripke, *Naming and Necessity*, 115-16, n. 58. For a discussion of surprising consequences of Geach’s account of restricted quantification see my "Some Radical Consequences of Geach’s Logical Theories." See also Hawthorne "Identity," 111-123.

The modification need only be applied to a fragment of English needed to make the theological claims associated with the Trinity and Incarnation.

This treatment of reduplication is not developed in Geach’s writings. In the final paragraph of "The Doctrine of the Trinity" I raise a concern regarding the extent to which the treatment of reduplicative expressions given here might be useful in discussions of the incarnation.

I have followed the Jedwab’s formulation in "Against the Geachian Theory," 135. "(SR)" stands for "sortal reduplication". See Cain, “The Doctrine of the Trinity,” 147 for the original, equivalent formulation.

I am following Jedwab’s formulation, "Against the Geachian Theory," 142.

On the Geachian account (SR) and (SR’) are equivalent and so serve equally well. Jedwab rejects the Geachian treatment of restricted quantifiers, and so he prefers (SR’) as an analysis of reduplicative expressions. Since Jedwab and I are agreed in our understanding of (SR’) and both accept (SR’) as a suitable analysis of reduplicative expressions, I will take (SR’) as giving the official analysis of reduplication.

The deductions are fairly straightforward and so I will not spell them out in detail. They rely on the transitivity and symmetry of relative identity. For more detail see either Cain, “The Doctrine of the Trinity,” or Jedwab, "Against the Geachian Theory."

See Geach, "Omnipotence," 19-20. In addition to some general remarks on the logic of reduplicative expressions, Geach considers examples in which we speak of "Jones as Mayor of Middletown" or "Jones as Director of the Gnome Works". These uses of reduplicative expressions do not fit the analysis given above.
Perhaps a natural Geachian analysis of "As a human, God lived among us" would be "Some human is the same God as the one and only God and lived among us." Similarly a natural analysis of "As a divine person, God begets" might be "Some divine person is the same God as the one and only God and (that divine person) begets". In this paper I will not be concerned to develop this sense of reduplicative expressions.

Jedwab, "Against the Geachian Theory," 136 and 140 ff.

Jedwab, "Against the Geachian Theory," 141.

"As a statue, the anointed one have been to both cities" is ambiguous between (i) "As a statue, the anointed one is such that: it has been to London and Paris" and (ii) "As a statue, the anointed one has been to London, and, as a statue, the anointed one has been to Paris". I am concerned here with the first reading.

Jedwab offers an analysis of "Christ is F" as "something is the same divine person as the Son and Jesus, is the same divine person as anything that is the same divine person as the Son and Jesus, and is F" ("Against the Geachian Theory," 143). One difficulty with this analysis is that it treats the claim "Christ is someone other than Jesus" as being analytically false. One might think that such a claim is false yet not a self-contradiction.

I will always assume that an adequate translation must preserve the truth-value of the sentence being translated.

To be somewhat more precise, suppose that "F" is a predicate of the G-language and "F*" is a translation of it into the J-language, then the G-language sentence "As an R, a is F" can be translated by the J-language sentence "As an R, a is F*".

Recall that in the G-language "Something is an R and is F*" is not generally equivalent to "Some R is F*".

"Against the Geachian Theory," 143. Here the word "God" in the predicates "is God" and "is the same God as" does not function as a definite description.

We may sketch an argument for (Tr4) as follows: The G-sentence (1) "The one and only R is F" is equivalent (by DG) to the G-sentence (2) "Some R x is such that, for any R y, y is the same R as x, and x is F", which is equivalent (since x is the same R as any R iff x is the same R as anything that is an R) to the G-sentence (3) "Some R x is such that, for anything y that is R, y is the same R as x, and x is F", which is equivalent to the G-sentence (4) "Some R x is such that x is an R, for anything y that is R, y is the same R as x, and x is F", which is equivalent (by TR2) to the J-sentence (5) "Something x is such that, as an R, x is an R, for anything y that is R, y is the same R as x, and x is F*", which is equivalent to the J-sentence (6) "Something x is such that x is an R, for anything y that is R, y is the same R as x, and, as an R, x is F*", which is equivalent (by DJ, substituting "as an R, is F*" for "F") to the J-
sentence (7) "The one and only R, as an R, is F*". The equivalence of (5) and (6) is trivial but tedious to spell out. It relies on (SR') together with the fact that "is the same R as" determines an equivalence relation.

34 Jedwab, "Against the Geachian Theory," 143.

35 Jedwab, "Against the Geachian Theory," 143.

36 As mentioned in fn. 24, under an alternative reading of reduplicative expressions the sentence "as a divine person, the one and only God begets" might be analyzed as equivalent to the true G-sentence "Some divine person is the same God as the one and only God and (that divine person) begets". The J-language translation of this last sentence will also be true.

37 Note that the G-sentence "God is a person" is equivalent to both the G-sentence "as God, God is a person" and the J-sentence "as God, God is a person". Thus the same difficulties that confront the Geachian account with regard to whether to say that God is a person confront Jedwab’s account with regard to whether to say that as God, God is a person. And as we saw, Jedwab holds that as God, God is not a divine person ("Against the Geachian Theory, 143).

Furthermore, if we were to add "Yahweh" to the J-language as a name of and for a God, then "as God, God is F" and "Yahweh is F" will always have the same truth value. Jedwab is thus committed to all of the following J-sentences:

(1) "As God, God is not a person," (2) "Yahweh is not a person," (3) "God is not a person," (4) "God is a person". (3) (which follows from (2) and the claim that Yahweh is the one and only God) must be read with the negation having a small scope and so read is not inconsistent with (4). While the commitments of the Geachian theory and Jedwab’s theory may not conflict here, I find the logic of the Geachian approach to be more transparent. On the G-language readings, (1), (2) and (3) will have the same truth value and will not agree in truth value with (4).

38 Jedwab, "Against the Geachian Theory," 127.